%0 Journal Article 
%T Asimetrías de información entre agente y principal de las universidades chilenas
%J ESTUDIOS GERENCIALES;Vol. 28 No. 122 - Enero/Marzo 2012
%D 2012
%@ 01235923
%U http://www.icesi.edu.co/revistas/index.php/estudios_gerenciales/article/view/1163
%X This research work is aimed at determining whether there are any informational asymmetries
between the presidents and the members of collegial bodies in Chilean universities. The framework
of agency theory, in which the president of a university plays the role of agent while the
collegial body serves as principal, assumes that this kind of asymmetry exists. The methodology
was based on a closed-ended questionnaire where respondents had to demonstrate their
knowledge of supposedly basic topics related to management performance. The results provide
compelling evidence confirming the agency theory, which contends that an agent holds more
information than a member of a collegial body, and, if internal, the member’s knowledge
exceeds that of external members.

%K FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ADMINISTRATIVAS Y ECONÓMICAS
%K PRODUCCIÓN INTELECTUAL REGISTRADA - UNIVERSIDAD ICESI
%K ASIMETRIA DE INFORMACION
%K PRINCIPAL-AGENTE
%K TEORIA DE LA AGENCIA
%K INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES
%K UNIVERSITIES
%K AGENCY THEORY; AGENT AND PRINCIPAL
%~ GOEDOC, SUB GOETTINGEN